That We Must Have a Right and Reasonable Mind.
We are men only by reason, and yet it is a rare thing to find men who are truly reasonable, self-love almost always troubling our minds, and leading us into a thousand kinds of petty but very dangerous injustices, which are much like those little foxes spoken of in the Canticle: for, because they are little, they are not noticed; but because they are numerous, they nevertheless do great harm, and cause great damage in the vineyards.
You shall judge, Philothea, whether the instances I am about to cite are not so many injustices and unreasonablenesses. We accuse our neighbour over small things, and excuse our grossest faults; we would sell very dear, and buy cheap; we would have justice done upon others, and mercy and clemency shown to ourselves; we would have our words taken in good part, and we are excessively touchy about the words of others; we would have our neighbour yield us his goods for a price, and is it not more just that he keep them, if it so please him, while leaving us our money? We bear him ill will because he will not accommodate us, and has he not much more reason to complain that we would inconvenience him?
We are men only by reason, and yet it is a rare thing to find men who are truly reasonable, self-love almost always troubling our minds, and leading us into a thousand kinds of petty but very dangerous injustices, which are much like those little foxes spoken of in the Canticle: for, because they are little, they are not noticed; but because they are numerous, they nevertheless do great harm, and cause great damage in the vineyards.
You shall judge, Philothea, whether the instances I am about to cite are not so many injustices and unreasonablenesses. We accuse our neighbour over small things, and excuse our grossest faults; we would sell very dear, and buy cheap; we would have justice done upon others, and mercy and clemency shown to ourselves; we would have our words taken in good part, and we are excessively touchy about the words of others; we would have our neighbour yield us his goods for a price, and is it not more just that he keep them, if it so please him, while leaving us our money? We bear him ill will because he will not accommodate us, and has he not much more reason to complain that we would inconvenience him?
If we are fond of one exercise, we despise all the rest, and condemn whatever does not please us. If any one of our inferiors is not of good grace, or if we have once taken a dislike to him, whatever he may do, we find fault with him; we never cease to grieve him, and are always finding cause to quarrel with him. On the contrary, if any one pleases us by his outward manners, there is nothing he does that we do not excuse. There are virtuous children whom their fathers and mothers can scarcely bear to look upon, because of some bodily imperfection; and there are vicious ones who are favourites because they are handsome. In all things we prefer the rich to the poor, although they are neither of better condition nor so virtuous: we even prefer those who are better dressed. We demand our rights to the utmost, and would have others be disinterested when it comes to theirs; we are scrupulous in maintaining our rank, and would have others be humble and condescending; we readily complain of our neighbour, and do not wish anyone to complain of us; we think highly of what we do for others, and count for nothing all that is done for us. In short, we are like the partridges of Paphlagonia, which have two hearts; for we have one that is gentle, gracious, and indulgent towards ourselves, and another that is hard, severe, and rigorous towards our neighbour. We have two weights: one with which to weigh our own interests to the greatest advantage we can, and the other with which to weigh the interests of others to their greatest possible disadvantage. Now, “to speak with one heart and one heart,” as Scripture says—that is, to have two hearts, and to have two weights, one heavy for receiving and the other light for giving—is an abomination before God.
In all your actions, Philothea, be even and just. Always put yourself in your neighbour’s place, and put him in yours, and thus you will judge well. Imagine yourself a seller when you buy, and a buyer when you sell, and you will sell and buy justly.
All these injustices are small and do not oblige us to make restitution, since I suppose we remain only within the bounds of strictness in what favours us; but they do oblige us at least to amend ourselves, because they are great failings in reason and charity, and at the end of them there are almost always real acts of cheating. Besides, one never loses anything by living generously, nobly, courteously, and with a loyal, just, and reasonable heart. Remember, then, Philothea, to examine your heart often, to see whether it is towards your neighbour what you would wish his to be towards you, supposing that you were in his place; for this is the point of true and right reason. When Trajan was reproached by his confidants for making imperial majesty, in their opinion, too accessible, “What then,” he said to them, “ought I not to be emperor to my subjects, as I would wish the emperor to be if I myself were a subject?”
All these injustices are small and do not oblige us to make restitution, since I suppose we remain only within the bounds of strictness in what favours us; but they do oblige us at least to amend ourselves, because they are great failings in reason and charity, and at the end of them there are almost always real acts of cheating. Besides, one never loses anything by living generously, nobly, courteously, and with a loyal, just, and reasonable heart. Remember, then, Philothea, to examine your heart often, to see whether it is towards your neighbour what you would wish his to be towards you, supposing that you were in his place; for this is the point of true and right reason. When Trajan was reproached by his confidants for making imperial majesty, in their opinion, too accessible, “What then,” he said to them, “ought I not to be emperor to my subjects, as I would wish the emperor to be if I myself were a subject?”