They are not free from ignorance, which necessarily produces covetousness; they are not free from covetousness—not passionate covetousness, we admit; for covetousness may be without passion, just as ignorance may be.
Moreover, feeling causes covetousness; yet your saints are not free from feeling: [therefore the vision of truth does not suffice to destroy the passions].
Likewise, nirvâna is impossible without the vision of emptiness, for as long as thought admits an object, it must rest upon the Noble Truths, upon their fruits, upon nirvâna itself: therefore it is not delivered from rebirth.
Without emptiness, thought remains bound to the object of knowledge and, consequently, even were it interrupted for a moment, it is condemned to be reborn: this is the case in the so-called unconscious ecstasy, in the ecstasy of destruction; this is the case with the unconscious gods, etc. Emptiness must therefore be cultivated.
[“But, it will be said, does your Great Vehicle lead to nirvâna?”] — Avoiding, through emptiness, the attachment produced by the thought of eternity and the terror caused by the thought of annihilation, if the Bodhisattva remains in existence, it is through a folly of compassion, it is for the salvation of wretched creatures. Such is the fruit of emptiness.
Moreover, feeling causes covetousness; yet your saints are not free from feeling: [therefore the vision of truth does not suffice to destroy the passions].
Likewise, nirvâna is impossible without the vision of emptiness, for as long as thought admits an object, it must rest upon the Noble Truths, upon their fruits, upon nirvâna itself: therefore it is not delivered from rebirth.
Without emptiness, thought remains bound to the object of knowledge and, consequently, even were it interrupted for a moment, it is condemned to be reborn: this is the case in the so-called unconscious ecstasy, in the ecstasy of destruction; this is the case with the unconscious gods, etc. Emptiness must therefore be cultivated.
[“But, it will be said, does your Great Vehicle lead to nirvâna?”] — Avoiding, through emptiness, the attachment produced by the thought of eternity and the terror caused by the thought of annihilation, if the Bodhisattva remains in existence, it is through a folly of compassion, it is for the salvation of wretched creatures. Such is the fruit of emptiness.
[One may also understand:] “Granted, belief in the reality of things gives rise to attachment to existence, the cause of rebirth; but the doctrine of emptiness produces the same result: through fear of annihilation, the wretched creatures, on account of their ignorance, do not attain liberation and remain in the existences of samsara.”
This objection raised against emptiness is unfounded; therefore, one must cultivate emptiness.
For emptiness is the cause that destroys the twofold obscuration, the obscuration created by passion and by knowledge. If you desire Omniscience, hasten to cultivate emptiness.
[You say that the idea of emptiness inspires fear, and thus hinders liberation: this may be true at first, but not when one reflects.] It is natural to fear what causes pain; but emptiness soothes pain: how could it inspire fear?
It is natural to fear what is frightening, and even what is not, so long as one believes in the reality of the self; but when one knows, through the doctrine of emptiness, that the self is nothing, who could be afraid, since there is no self?
Neither the teeth, nor the nails, nor the bones, nor the blood, nor the mucus, nor the phlegm, nor the pus, nor the saliva, nor the fat, nor the sweat, nor the lymph, nor the viscera, nor the…
This objection raised against emptiness is unfounded; therefore, one must cultivate emptiness.
For emptiness is the cause that destroys the twofold obscuration, the obscuration created by passion and by knowledge. If you desire Omniscience, hasten to cultivate emptiness.
[You say that the idea of emptiness inspires fear, and thus hinders liberation: this may be true at first, but not when one reflects.] It is natural to fear what causes pain; but emptiness soothes pain: how could it inspire fear?
It is natural to fear what is frightening, and even what is not, so long as one believes in the reality of the self; but when one knows, through the doctrine of emptiness, that the self is nothing, who could be afraid, since there is no self?
Neither the teeth, nor the nails, nor the bones, nor the blood, nor the mucus, nor the phlegm, nor the pus, nor the saliva, nor the fat, nor the sweat, nor the lymph, nor the viscera, nor the…
Intestines, faeces, urine, flesh, muscles, vital heat, breath, the nine apertures, the five kinds of sense-consciousness, nor intellectual consciousness, are the self.
61) For if auditory consciousness were the self, sound would always be perceived, since the self is held to be eternal. If you say that auditory consciousness is permanent, but that its object is sometimes absent, what does it know, in the absence of an object, that you define it as consciousness?
62) If that which does not know is “consciousness,” then a piece of wood will be “consciousness.” It is established that there can be no consciousness without an object related to that consciousness.
63) [Moreover, if the “self” is, by its nature, auditory consciousness, it cannot be visual consciousness:] if the same [“self,” which knows sound,] also knows colour, how is it that it does not hear [the sound] at the moment [when it sees colour]? — “Because,” one will say, “at that moment sound is not related to it.” — But then the self is not auditory consciousness.
64) How could a principle whose nature is to perceive sound perceive colour? That which is not composed of parts, as the self is by definition, cannot have two natures. Doubtless the same man is a father [to his son] and a son [to his father]; but this double nature is attributed to him by imagination; it is not real.
61) For if auditory consciousness were the self, sound would always be perceived, since the self is held to be eternal. If you say that auditory consciousness is permanent, but that its object is sometimes absent, what does it know, in the absence of an object, that you define it as consciousness?
62) If that which does not know is “consciousness,” then a piece of wood will be “consciousness.” It is established that there can be no consciousness without an object related to that consciousness.
63) [Moreover, if the “self” is, by its nature, auditory consciousness, it cannot be visual consciousness:] if the same [“self,” which knows sound,] also knows colour, how is it that it does not hear [the sound] at the moment [when it sees colour]? — “Because,” one will say, “at that moment sound is not related to it.” — But then the self is not auditory consciousness.
64) How could a principle whose nature is to perceive sound perceive colour? That which is not composed of parts, as the self is by definition, cannot have two natures. Doubtless the same man is a father [to his son] and a son [to his father]; but this double nature is attributed to him by imagination; it is not real.
65 a) You yourselves, adherents of the doctrine of Sâmkhya, deny the reality of all particular designations, for, according to you, what truly exists are the three “qualities”: goodness, passion, and darkness. Thus, in reality, there is neither father nor son.
65 b-66 a) When the “self” is engaged in knowing sound, [its nature as “visual cognition”] is not perceived; [yet, you say, it exists,] and it is by this second nature [that at other times it knows colour]: it follows that the self is like an actor [who assumes various costumes], and is not eternal.
66 b) [“But,” one will say, “the being—whether actor or self—remains the same; it is essences or modes of being that arise, perish, and are renewed.”] — A singular unity indeed, that of a being identical with itself and taking on new essences!
67 a) [“But the essences of the identical being are not all its essences in the same respect;] some of them are unreal.” — Tell us, then, what is its true essence, its own essence!
67 b) Is it the quality of knowing in general? It follows that all men are one and the same thing.
68 a) And [if one distinguishes true essence from adventitious essences in the same way], beings endowed with intelligence and those not endowed with intelligence will be held to be identical, since existence is common to them.
65 b-66 a) When the “self” is engaged in knowing sound, [its nature as “visual cognition”] is not perceived; [yet, you say, it exists,] and it is by this second nature [that at other times it knows colour]: it follows that the self is like an actor [who assumes various costumes], and is not eternal.
66 b) [“But,” one will say, “the being—whether actor or self—remains the same; it is essences or modes of being that arise, perish, and are renewed.”] — A singular unity indeed, that of a being identical with itself and taking on new essences!
67 a) [“But the essences of the identical being are not all its essences in the same respect;] some of them are unreal.” — Tell us, then, what is its true essence, its own essence!
67 b) Is it the quality of knowing in general? It follows that all men are one and the same thing.
68 a) And [if one distinguishes true essence from adventitious essences in the same way], beings endowed with intelligence and those not endowed with intelligence will be held to be identical, since existence is common to them.
68 b) [It will be said in vain that there is resemblance, but not identity, between men, between intelligent and non-intelligent beings.] When specific differences are declared unreal, — [by ascribing to the self the nature of “knowledge” in general, instead of distinguishing auditory, visual, etc., knowledge], — upon what will the notion of resemblance rest?
69) The self is not devoid of intelligence, for that which is devoid of intelligence, a piece of cloth for example, is not the self. — Will it be said that the self is intelligent by virtue of its union with an element called “intelligence”? It follows that the self is destroyed as soon as it is deprived of knowledge.
70) [This conclusion is rejected by saying that the self, whether united or not with the element “intelligence,” remains what it is.] But if the self remains unchanging, what consequences does its union with “intelligence” entail for it? None; and, logically, the quality of self must be attributed to space, which is likewise devoid of knowledge and activity.
“But, it will be said, the relation between an act and its retribution is inadmissible if there is no permanent ‘self’ who performs the act and partakes of the fruit. Suppose the performer of the act perishes: to whom will the fruit come?”
Our adversary agrees with us on this point, that the act and the fruit do not have the same basis: the act is performed by the body of this existence; the fruit is partaken of in a future life.
69) The self is not devoid of intelligence, for that which is devoid of intelligence, a piece of cloth for example, is not the self. — Will it be said that the self is intelligent by virtue of its union with an element called “intelligence”? It follows that the self is destroyed as soon as it is deprived of knowledge.
70) [This conclusion is rejected by saying that the self, whether united or not with the element “intelligence,” remains what it is.] But if the self remains unchanging, what consequences does its union with “intelligence” entail for it? None; and, logically, the quality of self must be attributed to space, which is likewise devoid of knowledge and activity.
“But, it will be said, the relation between an act and its retribution is inadmissible if there is no permanent ‘self’ who performs the act and partakes of the fruit. Suppose the performer of the act perishes: to whom will the fruit come?”
Our adversary agrees with us on this point, that the act and the fruit do not have the same basis: the act is performed by the body of this existence; the fruit is partaken of in a future life.
If, moreover, he maintains that the doing of the act and the tasting of the fruit presuppose the activity of the self, he contradicts himself: for his “self,” by definition, is devoid of activity. The discussion is therefore superfluous.
“But if there is no self, it follows that the act perishes for the doer of the act, and that the fruit is eaten by someone who did not perform the act!”—Indeed, it is not apparent that the doer of the act and the eater of the fruit are the same: he who dies is one, and he who is reborn another.
“But the Buddha expressly taught personal responsibility: ‘Such a one performed the act; who else shall taste its fruit?’ Therefore your doctrine is heretical.”—If the Buddha spoke of a “doer of the act” and an “eater of the fruit,” it was by ascribing to the mental continuum a unity which it does not possess.
Past thought and future thought are not the self, for they do not exist at present. Will present thought be the self? In that case, the self ceases to exist as soon as present thought vanishes.
Just as the trunk of the banana tree, when reduced to its parts, does not exist as such, so the self, the supposed object of the notion “I,” is unreal to one who examines it critically.
“But if there is no self, it follows that the act perishes for the doer of the act, and that the fruit is eaten by someone who did not perform the act!”—Indeed, it is not apparent that the doer of the act and the eater of the fruit are the same: he who dies is one, and he who is reborn another.
“But the Buddha expressly taught personal responsibility: ‘Such a one performed the act; who else shall taste its fruit?’ Therefore your doctrine is heretical.”—If the Buddha spoke of a “doer of the act” and an “eater of the fruit,” it was by ascribing to the mental continuum a unity which it does not possess.
Past thought and future thought are not the self, for they do not exist at present. Will present thought be the self? In that case, the self ceases to exist as soon as present thought vanishes.
Just as the trunk of the banana tree, when reduced to its parts, does not exist as such, so the self, the supposed object of the notion “I,” is unreal to one who examines it critically.
“But, you will say, if creatures do not exist, what then is the object of the future Buddha’s pity?”—It is the creature, assumed to exist through an illusion for the sake of the goal to be attained, namely, the state of Buddha.
“But, if creatures do not exist, who can have a goal to attain?”—No one, indeed, and the striving for enlightenment proceeds from illusion; but, since it has as its effect the pacification of pain, the illusion of the goal is not forbidden.
“But if you admit the illusion of the goal despite its erroneous nature, admit also the illusion of the self!”—The illusion of the self increases the sense of self, the cause of pain. And since the sense of self cannot be abolished so long as the illusion of the self endures, it is better to cultivate the idea of the non-existence of the self, which will later disappear of its own accord.
“But, one will say, if the self, as philosophers understand it, is not the really existing object of the idea of self, is not that object the body?”—The body is neither the feet, nor the legs, nor the thighs, nor the hips, nor the belly, nor the chest, nor the arms, nor the hands, nor the sides, nor the armpits, nor the shoulders, nor the neck, nor the head. Where among all these parts of the body is the body?
“But, if creatures do not exist, who can have a goal to attain?”—No one, indeed, and the striving for enlightenment proceeds from illusion; but, since it has as its effect the pacification of pain, the illusion of the goal is not forbidden.
“But if you admit the illusion of the goal despite its erroneous nature, admit also the illusion of the self!”—The illusion of the self increases the sense of self, the cause of pain. And since the sense of self cannot be abolished so long as the illusion of the self endures, it is better to cultivate the idea of the non-existence of the self, which will later disappear of its own accord.
“But, one will say, if the self, as philosophers understand it, is not the really existing object of the idea of self, is not that object the body?”—The body is neither the feet, nor the legs, nor the thighs, nor the hips, nor the belly, nor the chest, nor the arms, nor the hands, nor the sides, nor the armpits, nor the shoulders, nor the neck, nor the head. Where among all these parts of the body is the body?
“None of these limbs, taken separately, is the body; the body occupies them all, as the whole does its parts.” — This explanation is unsatisfactory. That the body should reside partly in all the limbs, that a part of the body should be found in each limb, is absurd, for one will ask whether the body is also found partially in each of its parts, whence a regressus ad infinitum; and, moreover, it is the various limbs that reside in the various limbs: they leave no room there for the body considered as possessing parts.
But if, on the contrary, the body is found wholly in each limb, in the hands, etc., not only does the objection remain that the limbs leave no room for the body, but, in addition, there will be as many bodies as there are limbs.
83) The body, [supposed basis of the notion “I”], is not within, [in the internal organs or elements, in an active purusha]. It is not without, for how could it reside in its limbs? It is not distinct from its limbs. What, then, is its mode of existence?
84) Therefore the body does not exist. If the notion of body is applied to the hands, etc., it is through an error determined by a certain arrangement [of the objects in question, the hands, etc.]: in the same way, a post is taken for a man.
But if, on the contrary, the body is found wholly in each limb, in the hands, etc., not only does the objection remain that the limbs leave no room for the body, but, in addition, there will be as many bodies as there are limbs.
83) The body, [supposed basis of the notion “I”], is not within, [in the internal organs or elements, in an active purusha]. It is not without, for how could it reside in its limbs? It is not distinct from its limbs. What, then, is its mode of existence?
84) Therefore the body does not exist. If the notion of body is applied to the hands, etc., it is through an error determined by a certain arrangement [of the objects in question, the hands, etc.]: in the same way, a post is taken for a man.
85) So long as a certain complex of causes is at work, so long is the body taken to be a man [or a woman: this is not so when it is in the state of an embryo or after cremation]; likewise, so long as a certain complex of causes concerning the limbs is at work, so long is a body seen in them.
86) [“Granted,” one will say, “there is no body, but the limbs of the body exist.” — This is a mistake.] Just as [the body], so too the foot does not exist, for it is only the sum of the toes; the toe is only the aggregate of the phalanges; the phalanges are divided into their parts.
87) These parts, in turn, [are not real, but imagined, since they] are subdivided into atoms; as for the atom, it does not exist in itself, for it is subdivided, facing the six cardinal directions; likewise also the six parts of the atom, [or, if] these parts have no parts, they are empty like space.
88) Therefore material things have no more reality than a dream-vision. What wise man could become attached [to anything?] And since the body does not exist, there is neither man nor woman.
89) If painful sensation is something real, why does it not injure those who are pleased? If something, a savoury food or [sandalwood], is pleasant in itself, why does a sorrowful or [frightened] man not enjoy it?
86) [“Granted,” one will say, “there is no body, but the limbs of the body exist.” — This is a mistake.] Just as [the body], so too the foot does not exist, for it is only the sum of the toes; the toe is only the aggregate of the phalanges; the phalanges are divided into their parts.
87) These parts, in turn, [are not real, but imagined, since they] are subdivided into atoms; as for the atom, it does not exist in itself, for it is subdivided, facing the six cardinal directions; likewise also the six parts of the atom, [or, if] these parts have no parts, they are empty like space.
88) Therefore material things have no more reality than a dream-vision. What wise man could become attached [to anything?] And since the body does not exist, there is neither man nor woman.
89) If painful sensation is something real, why does it not injure those who are pleased? If something, a savoury food or [sandalwood], is pleasant in itself, why does a sorrowful or [frightened] man not enjoy it?
90) It will be said that a man does not feel this or that sensation when it is overpowered by a stronger sensation: but can that which is not felt truly be called sensation?
91) It will be said that painful sensation exists in a subtle state, but that its “manifest state” is suppressed [by a more energetic pleasant sensation. But no degree of pain is felt when one feels pleasure. What, then, is subtle painful sensation?] A second sensation, [weaker], but wholly pleasurable? That is pleasure in a subtle state, and not suffering.
92) [“Granted, painful sensation is not always felt; but this does not prove that it is a creation of the mind: it is only that its causes are sometimes insufficient to make it perceptible.”] — We reply: if, according to you, in the presence of a cause of pleasure that contradicts it, painful sensation fails to emerge, do you not admit with us that sensation is nothing but assent to a mere imagination?
93 a) It follows that the inquiry we are pursuing here is the effective antidote to sensation, since sensation is nothing but the mind’s assent.
93 b) And what proves this abundantly is that the saints or Yogins have for their sole nourishment meditations born in the realm of pure concepts.
91) It will be said that painful sensation exists in a subtle state, but that its “manifest state” is suppressed [by a more energetic pleasant sensation. But no degree of pain is felt when one feels pleasure. What, then, is subtle painful sensation?] A second sensation, [weaker], but wholly pleasurable? That is pleasure in a subtle state, and not suffering.
92) [“Granted, painful sensation is not always felt; but this does not prove that it is a creation of the mind: it is only that its causes are sometimes insufficient to make it perceptible.”] — We reply: if, according to you, in the presence of a cause of pleasure that contradicts it, painful sensation fails to emerge, do you not admit with us that sensation is nothing but assent to a mere imagination?
93 a) It follows that the inquiry we are pursuing here is the effective antidote to sensation, since sensation is nothing but the mind’s assent.
93 b) And what proves this abundantly is that the saints or Yogins have for their sole nourishment meditations born in the realm of pure concepts.
94) Let us observe, moreover, that sensation cannot be produced by the cause assigned to it, contact. If the senses and the object are separate, how can they meet? If they are not separate, they form a unity, and meeting is likewise impossible.