1) The Buddha taught that this whole collection of virtues [, charity, morality, patience, strength, and meditation], has knowledge for its purpose: he who desires deliverance from suffering must therefore produce knowledge within himself.
2) Two truths are distinguished, with two corresponding orders of things that are true: the erroneous, or worldly, truth, to which corresponds what those who are in error see as true; and the true truth, to which corresponds reality: reality lies beyond the domain of the intellect; the intellect moves within the order of error.
3) Two kinds of men belonging to the world are distinguished, that is, moving within the sphere of erroneous truth: meditators and ordinary men. The view the former have of things contradicts and refutes that of the latter.
4) And the meditators, in their turn, contradict one another according to the ever-greater perfection of their knowledge: the wiser see better than the less advanced. Although they do not interpret in the same way this comparison from Scripture, they all acknowledge that things are like a mirage, a dream, a magical creation; they agree in refuting the opinion of ordinary men.—With a view to the goal to be attained, namely Buddhahood, there is no need to examine the metaphysical value of the means: the meditators know that these are illusions, yet they apply themselves to them nonetheless.
2) Two truths are distinguished, with two corresponding orders of things that are true: the erroneous, or worldly, truth, to which corresponds what those who are in error see as true; and the true truth, to which corresponds reality: reality lies beyond the domain of the intellect; the intellect moves within the order of error.
3) Two kinds of men belonging to the world are distinguished, that is, moving within the sphere of erroneous truth: meditators and ordinary men. The view the former have of things contradicts and refutes that of the latter.
4) And the meditators, in their turn, contradict one another according to the ever-greater perfection of their knowledge: the wiser see better than the less advanced. Although they do not interpret in the same way this comparison from Scripture, they all acknowledge that things are like a mirage, a dream, a magical creation; they agree in refuting the opinion of ordinary men.—With a view to the goal to be attained, namely Buddhahood, there is no need to examine the metaphysical value of the means: the meditators know that these are illusions, yet they apply themselves to them nonetheless.
5) Ordinary men see and conceive things as real, while meditators conceive them as illusory: such is the conflict between meditators and ordinary men.
6) The existence of colour, sound, etc., which are immediately perceived, is established not by valid means of knowledge but by the assent of the world; this assent is erroneous, like that which recognizes as pure, permanent, pleasant, etc., what is in reality impure, impermanent.
7) If the Buddha taught the existence of the skandhas, the constituent elements of so-called individuals, it was to introduce ignorant and prejudiced beings to the knowledge of “emptiness,” and not from the standpoint of true truth. — “How so?” one will say; “was it not from the standpoint of true truth that the Buddha taught the momentary nature of the skandhas?” — Mistake: the skandhas, etc., are not momentary from the standpoint of true truth, for, in reality, there are no skandhas — “It will therefore follow,” one will reply, “that the skandhas are momentary from the standpoint of apparent truth, and this assertion is contradicted by appearance, by experience.”
Mistake! For meditators, who know the non-existence of individuals, experience entails the momentariness of dharmas; and, compared with ordinary men, meditators see the truth! — Accept our view, or else we shall answer ad hominem: you maintain that the skandhas really exist and are momentary; for our part, appealing to the experience of ordinary men, we shall say that the world regards woman as “pure,” and contradicts you when you declare her “impure.”
6) The existence of colour, sound, etc., which are immediately perceived, is established not by valid means of knowledge but by the assent of the world; this assent is erroneous, like that which recognizes as pure, permanent, pleasant, etc., what is in reality impure, impermanent.
7) If the Buddha taught the existence of the skandhas, the constituent elements of so-called individuals, it was to introduce ignorant and prejudiced beings to the knowledge of “emptiness,” and not from the standpoint of true truth. — “How so?” one will say; “was it not from the standpoint of true truth that the Buddha taught the momentary nature of the skandhas?” — Mistake: the skandhas, etc., are not momentary from the standpoint of true truth, for, in reality, there are no skandhas — “It will therefore follow,” one will reply, “that the skandhas are momentary from the standpoint of apparent truth, and this assertion is contradicted by appearance, by experience.”
Mistake! For meditators, who know the non-existence of individuals, experience entails the momentariness of dharmas; and, compared with ordinary men, meditators see the truth! — Accept our view, or else we shall answer ad hominem: you maintain that the skandhas really exist and are momentary; for our part, appealing to the experience of ordinary men, we shall say that the world regards woman as “pure,” and contradicts you when you declare her “impure.”
“But,” it will be said, “what merit can arise from worshipping an illusory Buddha?”—The same question, we reply, is put in the same terms if the Buddha is something real.
“Be it so; but if what is called a ‘creature’ is an illusory thing, how does this creature, once dead, take rebirth?”—Because the illusion which constitutes this creature lasts as long as the complex of causes that produces it. Some illusions, such as a magical creation, for example, last but a short time; the creature, though illusory too, continues in a long succession: this is the only difference, which does not make the creature truly exist.
“But,” you will say, “there is no sin in killing or stealing from a phantom created by a magician: therefore, if creatures are illusory, all morality collapses?”—There is no thought in the magical creation, whereas creatures are clothed in that magic which is thought: hence sin and merit, according as creatures are treated ill or well.
“But thought is not a magic! For we see that magic formulas do not create thought.”—Magics differ in nature and are produced by different causes: it is not seen that one and the same cause produces every effect.
“Be it so; but if what is called a ‘creature’ is an illusory thing, how does this creature, once dead, take rebirth?”—Because the illusion which constitutes this creature lasts as long as the complex of causes that produces it. Some illusions, such as a magical creation, for example, last but a short time; the creature, though illusory too, continues in a long succession: this is the only difference, which does not make the creature truly exist.
“But,” you will say, “there is no sin in killing or stealing from a phantom created by a magician: therefore, if creatures are illusory, all morality collapses?”—There is no thought in the magical creation, whereas creatures are clothed in that magic which is thought: hence sin and merit, according as creatures are treated ill or well.
“But thought is not a magic! For we see that magic formulas do not create thought.”—Magics differ in nature and are produced by different causes: it is not seen that one and the same cause produces every effect.
“But if the creature is naught but a magical illusion; if the creature, in fact and in reality in the state of nirvâna, is found in the state of transmigration only from the point of view of appearance, only through the effect of an illusion, it follows that the Buddha Himself will continue to transmigrate: and hence what is the use of the practice of future Buddhas, what is the use of the Buddhist doctrine of salvation?”
So long as the causes thereof are not interrupted, so long does this illusion which is thought endure: and it is for this reason that creatures, in fact nonexistent, continue to transmigrate. But when the causes are destroyed, there is no more production of this magic of thought, there is no more existence of the creature, even from the point of view of empirical truth.
“If there does not really exist an illusioned principle, namely thought, who then perceives the illusion?”
If, as our opponent maintains, the illusion does not exist as an object, the illusioned thought alone exists: what is perceived?
“What is perceived is a form of thought, thought taking this or that aspect.” — But then this aspect of thought, posited as object, is, in reality, other than thought, the subject of knowledge.
So long as the causes thereof are not interrupted, so long does this illusion which is thought endure: and it is for this reason that creatures, in fact nonexistent, continue to transmigrate. But when the causes are destroyed, there is no more production of this magic of thought, there is no more existence of the creature, even from the point of view of empirical truth.
“If there does not really exist an illusioned principle, namely thought, who then perceives the illusion?”
If, as our opponent maintains, the illusion does not exist as an object, the illusioned thought alone exists: what is perceived?
“What is perceived is a form of thought, thought taking this or that aspect.” — But then this aspect of thought, posited as object, is, in reality, other than thought, the subject of knowledge.
Now you deny that the object of knowledge is different from the subject of knowledge: therefore illusion, the illusory object, is none other than thought, the subject of knowledge. But, on this supposition, what is perceived? What perceives? The Buddha, indeed, declared that thought does not see thought: just as the edge of a sword does not cut itself, so the mind does not apprehend itself.
“But, on the contrary, we maintain that thought, luminous, illuminates itself, as a lamp does.” — The comparison is invalid, for the lamp,
19 b-20 a “We do not claim that the lamp illuminates itself as it illuminates a pitcher, but rather that, to be what it is—that is, luminous—it needs no foreign intervention. For we observe that some things need no assistance from another, while others do: for example, to possess the quality of blueness, blue needs no other blue, but crystal does.”
20 b. This second example is invalid: if blue were not constituted as blue by its causes, it would not make itself blue by its own force.
22) [But let us admit that the lamp is, by its nature and of itself, luminous: this does not prove that the mind knows itself. For the mind observes and affirms that the lamp is luminous; but by what knowledge do we know that the mind is luminous? What knowledge affirms it? Thoughts or knowledge that are prior, subsequent, or simultaneous to the knowledge that would be perceived are obviously out of the question.]
“But, on the contrary, we maintain that thought, luminous, illuminates itself, as a lamp does.” — The comparison is invalid, for the lamp,
19 b-20 a “We do not claim that the lamp illuminates itself as it illuminates a pitcher, but rather that, to be what it is—that is, luminous—it needs no foreign intervention. For we observe that some things need no assistance from another, while others do: for example, to possess the quality of blueness, blue needs no other blue, but crystal does.”
20 b. This second example is invalid: if blue were not constituted as blue by its causes, it would not make itself blue by its own force.
22) [But let us admit that the lamp is, by its nature and of itself, luminous: this does not prove that the mind knows itself. For the mind observes and affirms that the lamp is luminous; but by what knowledge do we know that the mind is luminous? What knowledge affirms it? Thoughts or knowledge that are prior, subsequent, or simultaneous to the knowledge that would be perceived are obviously out of the question.]
23) Whether the mind is luminous by nature, like a lamp, or not luminous, like a jar, no one sees the mind: it is like the coquettishness of the daughter of a barren woman; it is idle sport to speak of it.
24) “But,” one will say, “if there is no self-awareness, how is it that one remembers one’s thought?”—When an object, external to the thought, has been perceived, it may happen that memory of it arises; and by association, one remembers [the perception of which it was the object,—without any need for a seed deposited in the thought by self-awareness]. Just as rat poison, introduced into the body at a certain time, manifests later, at the sound of thunder.
25 a) “But you admit that another’s thought appears to us when brought into relation with certain factors, magical powers, etc.: therefore thought is not always beyond perception, and we maintain that it can know itself, by virtue of certain other factors.”
25 b) This is bad reasoning: there are magical ointments, whose application enables one to perceive a hidden jar or treasure; but the jar is not the same thing as the ointments. Another’s thought can be known, just like the jar; but this does not prove that thought can know itself.
24) “But,” one will say, “if there is no self-awareness, how is it that one remembers one’s thought?”—When an object, external to the thought, has been perceived, it may happen that memory of it arises; and by association, one remembers [the perception of which it was the object,—without any need for a seed deposited in the thought by self-awareness]. Just as rat poison, introduced into the body at a certain time, manifests later, at the sound of thunder.
25 a) “But you admit that another’s thought appears to us when brought into relation with certain factors, magical powers, etc.: therefore thought is not always beyond perception, and we maintain that it can know itself, by virtue of certain other factors.”
25 b) This is bad reasoning: there are magical ointments, whose application enables one to perceive a hidden jar or treasure; but the jar is not the same thing as the ointments. Another’s thought can be known, just like the jar; but this does not prove that thought can know itself.
26) [“But if thought does not know itself, neither is the object known, and all experience must be denied.”] — In our system, we admit sensory knowledge, knowledge through testimony, and knowledge produced by reasoning; we admit all these as experientially true [and without examining them from the critical point of view]. But from the critical point of view, we condemn the supposition that experience is real: this supposition is the cause of suffering.
If the opponent’s text is in accord with his fundamental thesis, the object which he declares to be illusory is none other than thought; it is not identical with thought, according to what we have said above; it is not at once other than thought and identical with thought, for that is a contradiction; will it be said that it is neither other nor identical? That too is a contradiction. And, moreover, if the object really exists, it must indeed be other; if it is other, it does not really exist.
According to us, just as the illusory object, though nonexistent, is visible, so the mind, though nonexistent, sees.
“It must be, one will say, that samsara, the process of transmigration, defilement and purification, has as its support a real thing, namely thought.” — If samsara has a real thing as its support, it is different from that real thing and is therefore unreal, like space: for, in your system, thought alone is real.
If the opponent’s text is in accord with his fundamental thesis, the object which he declares to be illusory is none other than thought; it is not identical with thought, according to what we have said above; it is not at once other than thought and identical with thought, for that is a contradiction; will it be said that it is neither other nor identical? That too is a contradiction. And, moreover, if the object really exists, it must indeed be other; if it is other, it does not really exist.
According to us, just as the illusory object, though nonexistent, is visible, so the mind, though nonexistent, sees.
“It must be, one will say, that samsara, the process of transmigration, defilement and purification, has as its support a real thing, namely thought.” — If samsara has a real thing as its support, it is different from that real thing and is therefore unreal, like space: for, in your system, thought alone is real.
“Granted, samsara is unreal; but, taking its stand upon thought, which is real, it is endowed with activity.” Let us grant that a real thing may serve as a support for an unreal thing—which is false; it remains to be shown how an unreal thing can be endowed with activity by virtue of relying upon a real thing.
It follows that, for our adversaries, whatever they may say to the contrary, thought can only be utterly isolated, with nothing to accompany or defile it: if thought has no object, all creatures are Buddhas.
Now they maintain that creatures cling to the existence of subject and object. What, then, do they mean by, and what purpose does it serve to suppose, that thought alone exists?
“But,” they reply to us, “you are not free from the same criticism: if the illusory nature of thought, etc., is acknowledged, how can this knowledge destroy passion? We see the magician fall in love with the magical woman he himself has created.”
This objection does not hold: the magician in question has not rid himself of the tendency to attribute reality to sensory perceptions; at the sight of this woman, the idea he has of her nothingness remains powerless to prevent passion from arising.
It follows that, for our adversaries, whatever they may say to the contrary, thought can only be utterly isolated, with nothing to accompany or defile it: if thought has no object, all creatures are Buddhas.
Now they maintain that creatures cling to the existence of subject and object. What, then, do they mean by, and what purpose does it serve to suppose, that thought alone exists?
“But,” they reply to us, “you are not free from the same criticism: if the illusory nature of thought, etc., is acknowledged, how can this knowledge destroy passion? We see the magician fall in love with the magical woman he himself has created.”
This objection does not hold: the magician in question has not rid himself of the tendency to attribute reality to sensory perceptions; at the sight of this woman, the idea he has of her nothingness remains powerless to prevent passion from arising.
But when one assumes the idea of emptiness and imbues oneself with it, the idea of existence disappears; and later, through habituation to the thought that “nothing exists,” the very idea of emptiness is eliminated.
For when, owing to the elimination of the idea of existence, one no longer perceives any existence that could be denied, how then could non-existence, now deprived of a basis, present itself to the mind?
And when neither existence nor non-existence presents itself to the mind, then, having no longer anything to affirm or deny, which are these two modes of action, the mind comes to rest.
“But,” one might say, “if the Buddha is thus definitively at rest, how can He accomplish the salvation of creatures?”—Just as the miraculous gem or the wish-fulfilling tree satisfies the desires of creatures, so the miraculous body of the Buddha appears as a source of bliss, through the power of the resolutions made by the Buddha when He was a Bodhisattva, and through that of the pious deeds of the faithful themselves.
Likewise, a snake-charmer may die after consecrating a “healing post”: after his death, that post continues for a long time to heal the bites of snakes.
Thus has the Bodhisattva consecrated this “post of the Victor,” which is the practice of future Buddhas: although the Bodhisattva has passed into nirvâna, this post does all that must be done.
For when, owing to the elimination of the idea of existence, one no longer perceives any existence that could be denied, how then could non-existence, now deprived of a basis, present itself to the mind?
And when neither existence nor non-existence presents itself to the mind, then, having no longer anything to affirm or deny, which are these two modes of action, the mind comes to rest.
“But,” one might say, “if the Buddha is thus definitively at rest, how can He accomplish the salvation of creatures?”—Just as the miraculous gem or the wish-fulfilling tree satisfies the desires of creatures, so the miraculous body of the Buddha appears as a source of bliss, through the power of the resolutions made by the Buddha when He was a Bodhisattva, and through that of the pious deeds of the faithful themselves.
Likewise, a snake-charmer may die after consecrating a “healing post”: after his death, that post continues for a long time to heal the bites of snakes.
Thus has the Bodhisattva consecrated this “post of the Victor,” which is the practice of future Buddhas: although the Bodhisattva has passed into nirvâna, this post does all that must be done.
“But,” it may be said, “how can worship offered to a being devoid of thought be efficacious?”—For no Buddhist is there reason to distinguish between worship of the living Buddha and worship of the Buddha who has passed away: according to Scripture, they are equally fruitful. Whether the fruit be real or merely apparent, opinions differ. Therefore, worship of an illusory Buddha is fruitful; if it were otherwise, how could worship of a real Buddha be fruitful? Since this Buddha, in any case, has passed away.
“The sight of the Noble Ones produces liberation: what need is there of the sight of emptiness?”—Because, according to Scripture, neither Bodhi nor even liberation is attained except by this path of the sight of emptiness.
“[But the Scripture you cite is the Great Vehicle:] yet I do not admit the authenticity of the Great Vehicle.”—And for what reason do you admit the authenticity of your Scriptures?—“Because we are two who admit it.”—But, for yourself, the authenticity of your Scriptures was not established before you had admitted it.
The reasons you have for venerating your Scriptures demand the same respect for the Great Vehicle, [for it presents the same internal marks of authenticity].
“[But non-Buddhists recognize the authenticity of our Scriptures, and do not recognize the authenticity of yours!]”—If one must rely on the opinion of unbelievers, it follows that the Veda is true, as are all the Brahmanical doctrines.
“The sight of the Noble Ones produces liberation: what need is there of the sight of emptiness?”—Because, according to Scripture, neither Bodhi nor even liberation is attained except by this path of the sight of emptiness.
“[But the Scripture you cite is the Great Vehicle:] yet I do not admit the authenticity of the Great Vehicle.”—And for what reason do you admit the authenticity of your Scriptures?—“Because we are two who admit it.”—But, for yourself, the authenticity of your Scriptures was not established before you had admitted it.
The reasons you have for venerating your Scriptures demand the same respect for the Great Vehicle, [for it presents the same internal marks of authenticity].
“[But non-Buddhists recognize the authenticity of our Scriptures, and do not recognize the authenticity of yours!]”—If one must rely on the opinion of unbelievers, it follows that the Veda is true, as are all the Brahmanical doctrines.
“But, you will say, the partisans of the Great Vehicle do not agree among themselves?”—[If this argument holds,] you have only to abandon your own Scriptures: for you, [partisans of the Lesser Vehicle,] are at variance with the unbelievers, and at variance among yourselves.
The religion of the Buddha has for its root the state of a religious one, [that is, the destruction of the passions]. And the state of a religious one—as also nirvâna [which is its fruit]—is impossible so long as thought rests upon an object. [Therefore the view of emptiness is indispensable.]
If the destruction of the passions, [insofar as it is brought about by the view of the truths], suffices to bring about deliverance, it follows that deliverance will immediately follow [the view of the truths and] the corresponding destruction of the passions: but this is not so, for Scripture teaches that [the saints of the Lesser Vehicle, who possess the view of the truths,] are capable of actions [good or evil, though] not passionate actions.
“But, you will say, they are free from thirst or craving, the cause [of rebirth].”—[No, for they
95) “But atoms are devoid of parts: whence it follows that they come into contact without penetrating one another.”—Indeed, an atom cannot penetrate another atom; an atom has no empty space, it offers neither hollow nor projection. [If you say that there is no penetration between atoms, but only contact: this explanation remains insufficient: for since an atom has no parts, it can come into contact only in its entirety.] Therefore there is no contact if there is no mixture, and there is no mixture if there is no penetration.
The religion of the Buddha has for its root the state of a religious one, [that is, the destruction of the passions]. And the state of a religious one—as also nirvâna [which is its fruit]—is impossible so long as thought rests upon an object. [Therefore the view of emptiness is indispensable.]
If the destruction of the passions, [insofar as it is brought about by the view of the truths], suffices to bring about deliverance, it follows that deliverance will immediately follow [the view of the truths and] the corresponding destruction of the passions: but this is not so, for Scripture teaches that [the saints of the Lesser Vehicle, who possess the view of the truths,] are capable of actions [good or evil, though] not passionate actions.
“But, you will say, they are free from thirst or craving, the cause [of rebirth].”—[No, for they
95) “But atoms are devoid of parts: whence it follows that they come into contact without penetrating one another.”—Indeed, an atom cannot penetrate another atom; an atom has no empty space, it offers neither hollow nor projection. [If you say that there is no penetration between atoms, but only contact: this explanation remains insufficient: for since an atom has no parts, it can come into contact only in its entirety.] Therefore there is no contact if there is no mixture, and there is no mixture if there is no penetration.
96) It is impossible for a thing devoid of parts to be united with another: wherever conjunction is found, it is of divisible things.
97 a) As for visual cognition, etc., [which, in order to produce sensation, would have to come into contact with the sense organ and with the external object], it is immaterial: how could it be susceptible of conjunction?
97 b) As for masses, [material objects formed of atoms], they do not truly exist, [being but a heap of parts]: this has been demonstrated above.
98 a) Therefore, what is called “contact” does not exist; therefore sensation is impossible.
98 b-99) Why, then, these efforts [to obtain pleasure or to avoid suffering]? Who could [enjoy pleasure or] suffer from suffering? And thou, Craving, dost thou not see that there is neither sensation nor one who feels? What, then, hast thou to do here?
100) Doubtless one sees, touches, knows: but the thought that is the agent of these operations is like magic, like a dream-vision, [for it is produced by causes]. Moreover, that which is known, touched, or seen arises with knowing, touching, or seeing, being contained in that same complex which produces thought. — Consequently, sensation does not exist.
97 a) As for visual cognition, etc., [which, in order to produce sensation, would have to come into contact with the sense organ and with the external object], it is immaterial: how could it be susceptible of conjunction?
97 b) As for masses, [material objects formed of atoms], they do not truly exist, [being but a heap of parts]: this has been demonstrated above.
98 a) Therefore, what is called “contact” does not exist; therefore sensation is impossible.
98 b-99) Why, then, these efforts [to obtain pleasure or to avoid suffering]? Who could [enjoy pleasure or] suffer from suffering? And thou, Craving, dost thou not see that there is neither sensation nor one who feels? What, then, hast thou to do here?
100) Doubtless one sees, touches, knows: but the thought that is the agent of these operations is like magic, like a dream-vision, [for it is produced by causes]. Moreover, that which is known, touched, or seen arises with knowing, touching, or seeing, being contained in that same complex which produces thought. — Consequently, sensation does not exist.
101) [“We admit that ‘what is seen,’ being produced at the same time as vision, is not seen: but, from ‘what is seen,’ there arises subsequently a knowledge which assumes the form of the ‘object’ and perceives it.”] — Whether prior or subsequent, [the knowledge] may be what is called “memory,” but not what is called “sensation”: sensation does not know itself, nor is it perceived by another [simultaneous] knowledge.
102) There is no subject of sensation, [thought or some other principle]; therefore sensation does not truly exist. This whole [process and] complex [mental and physical] is devoid of a “self”; there is no individual, substantial being bound by sensation.
103) Knowledge or mind is found neither in the sense organs, nor in objects, nor between the two, nor within the body, nor in the limbs of the body. Its existence is nowhere else to be found.
104) That which exists neither within the body, nor outside the body, neither in a state of mixture, nor in a state of isolation, does not exist: therefore, by their own nature, creatures are in a state of absolute nirvâna.
105-106 a) If [visual, etc.] knowledge precedes its object, on what does it rest in order to arise? On what does it rest if it is simultaneous with it or subsequent to it?
102) There is no subject of sensation, [thought or some other principle]; therefore sensation does not truly exist. This whole [process and] complex [mental and physical] is devoid of a “self”; there is no individual, substantial being bound by sensation.
103) Knowledge or mind is found neither in the sense organs, nor in objects, nor between the two, nor within the body, nor in the limbs of the body. Its existence is nowhere else to be found.
104) That which exists neither within the body, nor outside the body, neither in a state of mixture, nor in a state of isolation, does not exist: therefore, by their own nature, creatures are in a state of absolute nirvâna.
105-106 a) If [visual, etc.] knowledge precedes its object, on what does it rest in order to arise? On what does it rest if it is simultaneous with it or subsequent to it?
106 b) The same considerations establish that nothing, in reality, can be produced [: the effect can be neither prior to, simultaneous with, nor subsequent to the cause].
107) “But if appearances are unreal, it is false that there are two truths [and the whole edifice of spiritual life, built upon the truth of appearance, collapses]; or else [you will say that reality, empty in itself, when taken as an object by intelligence, which is illusion, assumes the aspect called ‘apparent’: it will follow that], since the illusion ‘appearance’ is created by another illusion, ‘intelligence’, the creature cannot attain nirvâna.”
108) [We exist through the illusion that we exist, but] the liberated being does not exist through an illusion of his own: the fact that he is the object of another being’s illusory thought does not make him exist even from the point of view of appearances. — That which is determined by causes exists apparently; that which is not produced by causes does not exist with apparent existence.
109) [“But if, in reality, no thing is produced, if knowledge and its object have no true existence, what are we to think of the critical examination you pursue here, and of yourself?”] — The mind that supposes and the thing supposed exist in dependence upon one another. Every critical examination, whatever it may be, rests upon these two facts as they are accepted in the world [, and not upon true truth].
107) “But if appearances are unreal, it is false that there are two truths [and the whole edifice of spiritual life, built upon the truth of appearance, collapses]; or else [you will say that reality, empty in itself, when taken as an object by intelligence, which is illusion, assumes the aspect called ‘apparent’: it will follow that], since the illusion ‘appearance’ is created by another illusion, ‘intelligence’, the creature cannot attain nirvâna.”
108) [We exist through the illusion that we exist, but] the liberated being does not exist through an illusion of his own: the fact that he is the object of another being’s illusory thought does not make him exist even from the point of view of appearances. — That which is determined by causes exists apparently; that which is not produced by causes does not exist with apparent existence.
109) [“But if, in reality, no thing is produced, if knowledge and its object have no true existence, what are we to think of the critical examination you pursue here, and of yourself?”] — The mind that supposes and the thing supposed exist in dependence upon one another. Every critical examination, whatever it may be, rests upon these two facts as they are accepted in the world [, and not upon true truth].
110) “But, you will say, this critical examination, being within the domain of illusory truth, must itself be criticized; and if one criticizes the critique, one cannot come to a stop, for the new critique too will have to be criticized.”
111) [You are mistaken:] when what is to be criticized [that is, the commonly accepted notions of knowledge, and so forth] has been critically examined, there is no longer any basis for examination [, for the notions have dissolved.] Hence examination no longer takes place [, nor any mental operation], and this is nirvāṇa.
112-113) As for one who admits the true existence of critical examination and of the thing examined, his position is disastrous, for either he acknowledges the existence of the object on the basis of knowledge, and then how is the existence of knowledge established? Or knowledge is established on the basis of the object, and then how is the existence of the object established? Or the existence of the object is established by knowledge, and vice versa: in that case neither is established [, for this is circular reasoning].
114) [Let us give an example:] if there is no “father” when there is no “son,” how can the son be born? Yet there is no father in the absence of a son. Therefore neither exists.
111) [You are mistaken:] when what is to be criticized [that is, the commonly accepted notions of knowledge, and so forth] has been critically examined, there is no longer any basis for examination [, for the notions have dissolved.] Hence examination no longer takes place [, nor any mental operation], and this is nirvāṇa.
112-113) As for one who admits the true existence of critical examination and of the thing examined, his position is disastrous, for either he acknowledges the existence of the object on the basis of knowledge, and then how is the existence of knowledge established? Or knowledge is established on the basis of the object, and then how is the existence of the object established? Or the existence of the object is established by knowledge, and vice versa: in that case neither is established [, for this is circular reasoning].
114) [Let us give an example:] if there is no “father” when there is no “son,” how can the son be born? Yet there is no father in the absence of a son. Therefore neither exists.
115) “[But we do not say that cognition and its object produce one another!] Even as, we say, a sprout is born from a seed, and the seed is revealed, manifested by the sprout, so it is possible to infer the existence of the object from the cognition produced by that object.”
116) From a sprout one infers the existence of a seed: but this inference is drawn, not by the sprout, but by a [third] principle, namely cognition [possessed of all the necessary information: the existence of sprouts and seeds, and the relation of effect to cause between the sprout and the seed]; but how is the existence of cognition known, [in the absence of self-awareness, shown to be inadmissible], from which one might infer that of the object?
117) The world, by direct perception [and reasoning], recognizes the existence of causes of diverse kinds: the variety of the lotus’s several parts proceeds from the variety of its cause.
118) And what is the origin of the variety of the cause? The variety of the preceding cause, [and so on to infinity, without this regressus being vicious, since samsāra, or the evolution of the universe, had no origin]. — And by what efficacy does the cause give rise to this or that effect? By the efficacy of the preceding cause.
116) From a sprout one infers the existence of a seed: but this inference is drawn, not by the sprout, but by a [third] principle, namely cognition [possessed of all the necessary information: the existence of sprouts and seeds, and the relation of effect to cause between the sprout and the seed]; but how is the existence of cognition known, [in the absence of self-awareness, shown to be inadmissible], from which one might infer that of the object?
117) The world, by direct perception [and reasoning], recognizes the existence of causes of diverse kinds: the variety of the lotus’s several parts proceeds from the variety of its cause.
118) And what is the origin of the variety of the cause? The variety of the preceding cause, [and so on to infinity, without this regressus being vicious, since samsāra, or the evolution of the universe, had no origin]. — And by what efficacy does the cause give rise to this or that effect? By the efficacy of the preceding cause.
119) “God is the cause of the world.” — What do you mean by God? The elements? Then there is no need, over a question of words, to take so much trouble to prove the existence of God.
But the elements, earth, and so forth, are manifold, impermanent, without [intelligence and] activity, devoid of anything divine or venerable, impure: the elements are not God. Space, devoid of activity, is not God; nor is the Ātman, for we have seen that the Ātman does not exist.
Will you say that God is too great for us to understand? His qualities, too, would then surpass thought, and how could the quality of creator of the world be attributed to Him?
But if God, in His nature, is incomprehensible, His work is comprehensible. — So be it, but we shall ask what He may have wished to create. Could it be Brahman, the “self” of creatures? But this is eternal. Could it be the elements? They are eternal. Would God create Himself? He is eternal. — Moreover, knowledge is not created by God, since it has always arisen from its object; pain and pleasure arise from action. What, then, has God created?
If the cause is always active and does not begin to act at certain times, how could the effect begin? Now, after every chaos, the universe begins anew: therefore the cause is not an eternal and immutable God.
But the elements, earth, and so forth, are manifold, impermanent, without [intelligence and] activity, devoid of anything divine or venerable, impure: the elements are not God. Space, devoid of activity, is not God; nor is the Ātman, for we have seen that the Ātman does not exist.
Will you say that God is too great for us to understand? His qualities, too, would then surpass thought, and how could the quality of creator of the world be attributed to Him?
But if God, in His nature, is incomprehensible, His work is comprehensible. — So be it, but we shall ask what He may have wished to create. Could it be Brahman, the “self” of creatures? But this is eternal. Could it be the elements? They are eternal. Would God create Himself? He is eternal. — Moreover, knowledge is not created by God, since it has always arisen from its object; pain and pleasure arise from action. What, then, has God created?
If the cause is always active and does not begin to act at certain times, how could the effect begin? Now, after every chaos, the universe begins anew: therefore the cause is not an eternal and immutable God.
Why does God not at all times accomplish the creation, preservation, and destruction of the universe? Apparently, He need take no account of anyone but Himself, for He has no other whom He did not Himself create. What, then, is He waiting for before He acts?
Must He take account of a complex of conditions, as the potter needs clay, etc., to make a jar? Then God is not the cause of whom you spoke. He is not free not to act when the complex of conditions is present; He is not free to act when that complex is absent.
If God acts without desiring to do so, He is evidently subject to another; if He acts with desire, He is subject to desire. Therefore, if He acts, He is not sovereign.
Above, we refuted the Mīmāṃsakas and other philosophers who assert the eternity of atoms.
The Sāṁkhyas assert that the eternal cause of the world is the pradhāna, or Nature, that is, the three “qualities”—goodness, passion, and darkness—in a state of equilibrium. The world is nothing other than these three qualities in a state of disequilibrium.
But it is inadmissible that the pradhāna, being one, should have a threefold nature: therefore it does not exist. “Granted,” one may say, “but the qualities exist in themselves.” Not so, for taken one by one, they are threefold. For you say that everything is formed of the three “qualities”: each quality therefore possesses, besides its own nature, that of the other two.
Must He take account of a complex of conditions, as the potter needs clay, etc., to make a jar? Then God is not the cause of whom you spoke. He is not free not to act when the complex of conditions is present; He is not free to act when that complex is absent.
If God acts without desiring to do so, He is evidently subject to another; if He acts with desire, He is subject to desire. Therefore, if He acts, He is not sovereign.
Above, we refuted the Mīmāṃsakas and other philosophers who assert the eternity of atoms.
The Sāṁkhyas assert that the eternal cause of the world is the pradhāna, or Nature, that is, the three “qualities”—goodness, passion, and darkness—in a state of equilibrium. The world is nothing other than these three qualities in a state of disequilibrium.
But it is inadmissible that the pradhāna, being one, should have a threefold nature: therefore it does not exist. “Granted,” one may say, “but the qualities exist in themselves.” Not so, for taken one by one, they are threefold. For you say that everything is formed of the three “qualities”: each quality therefore possesses, besides its own nature, that of the other two.
If the “qualities” do not exist, neither do sound, contact, and the like.
Moreover, it is absurd to suppose that pleasure, and the like, are part of the nature of garments, which are devoid of thought. — Will you say that garments have pleasure for their nature because they produce it, not because they are pleasure in themselves? — We have shown that things are illusory. And besides, for you, partisan of the Sāṃkhya, it is pleasure, and the like, that is the cause, not garments, and the like.
Yet the contrary is observed: there is pleasure because of garments, and the like; there is no pleasure in the absence of a garment.
As for the eternity and immutability that you ascribe to pleasure, and the like, which are the essence of the “qualities” of goodness, and so forth, they do not exist. If pleasure always existed in a manifest state, it would always be perceived. Will it be said that it passes into a subtle state, that it returns from “act” to “potentiality”? How can it be successively manifest and subtle?
If, abandoning the manifest state, it becomes subtle, subtlety and manifestation are transient: and you are compelled to admit that all your twenty-five principles are so likewise: if manifested pleasure is not other than pleasure, it is clear that pleasure is transient.
Moreover, it is absurd to suppose that pleasure, and the like, are part of the nature of garments, which are devoid of thought. — Will you say that garments have pleasure for their nature because they produce it, not because they are pleasure in themselves? — We have shown that things are illusory. And besides, for you, partisan of the Sāṃkhya, it is pleasure, and the like, that is the cause, not garments, and the like.
Yet the contrary is observed: there is pleasure because of garments, and the like; there is no pleasure in the absence of a garment.
As for the eternity and immutability that you ascribe to pleasure, and the like, which are the essence of the “qualities” of goodness, and so forth, they do not exist. If pleasure always existed in a manifest state, it would always be perceived. Will it be said that it passes into a subtle state, that it returns from “act” to “potentiality”? How can it be successively manifest and subtle?
If, abandoning the manifest state, it becomes subtle, subtlety and manifestation are transient: and you are compelled to admit that all your twenty-five principles are so likewise: if manifested pleasure is not other than pleasure, it is clear that pleasure is transient.
But will it be said: “It is inadmissible, precisely because of its non-existence, that a non-existent thing should come into being!” — Well said or ill, you must admit the arising of the non-existent manifestation. [And why should it not be the same with the rest?]
If, as you maintain, the effect resides in the cause, then one eats filth when one eats rice; one may buy cottonseed for clothing and wrap oneself in it.
“But,” it will be said, “[although the effect is in the cause], men of the world, through delusion, do not see it.” — So be it; yet it seems that you yourself, who know the truth, conduct yourself like people of the world! [You eat rice! You do not clothe yourself in cottonseed!]
Moreover, it is not only the philosopher but also the common man who possesses this faculty of knowledge [by which one knows that “the effect is in the cause”]; why, then, does the ordinary man not see [things as they truly are]? — Will it be said that the way the ordinary man sees has no authority? It follows that things said to be manifested [and apprehended by the means of knowledge, perception, etc.,] do not exist. [And this is precisely our thesis, we Mâdhyamikas, who deny the validity of the means of knowledge.]
If, as you maintain, the effect resides in the cause, then one eats filth when one eats rice; one may buy cottonseed for clothing and wrap oneself in it.
“But,” it will be said, “[although the effect is in the cause], men of the world, through delusion, do not see it.” — So be it; yet it seems that you yourself, who know the truth, conduct yourself like people of the world! [You eat rice! You do not clothe yourself in cottonseed!]
Moreover, it is not only the philosopher but also the common man who possesses this faculty of knowledge [by which one knows that “the effect is in the cause”]; why, then, does the ordinary man not see [things as they truly are]? — Will it be said that the way the ordinary man sees has no authority? It follows that things said to be manifested [and apprehended by the means of knowledge, perception, etc.,] do not exist. [And this is precisely our thesis, we Mâdhyamikas, who deny the validity of the means of knowledge.]
“But,” it may be said, “if the means of knowledge are not, [in reality], means of knowledge, it follows that the knowledge obtained by these means is false: therefore, from the standpoint of absolute truth, it is false that all things are empty.”
When no heed is paid to things to which existence is falsely attributed, their non-existence is no more conceived: the non-existence of a “false” thing, [that is, one without intrinsic nature], is manifestly false.
Suppose one dreams of the death of a son: the idea of the son’s non-existence [or death]—which is a false idea—arrests the idea of the son’s existence, an idea just as false.
Critical examination demonstrates that nothing exists without a cause; that nothing is found to exist in causes taken either separately or together; that nothing comes from one place or time to another place or time; that nothing endures identical with itself; that nothing passes elsewhere. In what, then, do things differ from magic, which fools hold to be real?
Whether it be a thing created by magical power or a thing created by causes, take the trouble, then, to seek whence it comes and whither it goes!
When no heed is paid to things to which existence is falsely attributed, their non-existence is no more conceived: the non-existence of a “false” thing, [that is, one without intrinsic nature], is manifestly false.
Suppose one dreams of the death of a son: the idea of the son’s non-existence [or death]—which is a false idea—arrests the idea of the son’s existence, an idea just as false.
Critical examination demonstrates that nothing exists without a cause; that nothing is found to exist in causes taken either separately or together; that nothing comes from one place or time to another place or time; that nothing endures identical with itself; that nothing passes elsewhere. In what, then, do things differ from magic, which fools hold to be real?
Whether it be a thing created by magical power or a thing created by causes, take the trouble, then, to seek whence it comes and whither it goes!
What appears through the concurrence of extraneous elements, and does not appear for lack of that concurrence, is but a reflection, an artificial thing devoid of all reality.
That which exists has no need of causes; that which does not exist has no need of causes, for billions of causes could not alter the non-existent.
“It is not, one will say, a matter of altering the non-existent, but only of giving it existence.” — How could that which is in a state of non-existence become
existent? And what can come into existence, save the non-existent?
First, one will say, because of the presence of non-existence, the thing does not exist; later, through the disappearance of non-existence, the thing exists. — If existence does not exist at the time of non-existence, existence will never be; for non-existence will not disappear until existence has arisen; and, moreover, so long as non-existence has not disappeared, existence cannot begin.
Likewise, a thing cannot pass into non-existence: it would follow that one and the same thing possessed the twofold nature of existence and non-existence.
Therefore there is never either annihilation or existence: this whole universe is free from birth as from destruction; the successive destinies of creatures are illusory as dreams, empty as the trunk of the banana tree. There is no real difference between creatures who are liberated and those who transmigrate.
That which exists has no need of causes; that which does not exist has no need of causes, for billions of causes could not alter the non-existent.
“It is not, one will say, a matter of altering the non-existent, but only of giving it existence.” — How could that which is in a state of non-existence become
existent? And what can come into existence, save the non-existent?
First, one will say, because of the presence of non-existence, the thing does not exist; later, through the disappearance of non-existence, the thing exists. — If existence does not exist at the time of non-existence, existence will never be; for non-existence will not disappear until existence has arisen; and, moreover, so long as non-existence has not disappeared, existence cannot begin.
Likewise, a thing cannot pass into non-existence: it would follow that one and the same thing possessed the twofold nature of existence and non-existence.
Therefore there is never either annihilation or existence: this whole universe is free from birth as from destruction; the successive destinies of creatures are illusory as dreams, empty as the trunk of the banana tree. There is no real difference between creatures who are liberated and those who transmigrate.
Things are empty: nothing can be gained or stolen, no one can be honoured or despised by anyone; pleasure, suffering, the pleasant, the unpleasant are vain fictions, and though one seek covetousness, nowhere is covetousness to be found.
Let us examine the world of the living: what are creatures? who dies? who is reborn? who has lived? who is a parent or a friend?
Let us therefore strive, O my brothers in ignorance, to understand that all is empty as space: we grow angry over vain disputes, we rejoice at empty feasts; pursuing our own pleasure, we pass our lives painfully, in sin, full of sorrows, efforts, and despair; we torture and mutilate one another; after death, we fall into the long torments of hell, made more cruel by habits of happiness multiplied in fortunate destinies.
Existences are oceans of pain, incomparable, terrible, without shores; and with this, feeble strength, a short life, a life spent uselessly seeking food and health amid hunger, sickness, weariness, sleep, sorrows or obstacles, amid fools: it is almost impossible to acquire discernment of what is beneficial and harmful, or to try to put an end to the deeply rooted habit of distraction.
Let us examine the world of the living: what are creatures? who dies? who is reborn? who has lived? who is a parent or a friend?
Let us therefore strive, O my brothers in ignorance, to understand that all is empty as space: we grow angry over vain disputes, we rejoice at empty feasts; pursuing our own pleasure, we pass our lives painfully, in sin, full of sorrows, efforts, and despair; we torture and mutilate one another; after death, we fall into the long torments of hell, made more cruel by habits of happiness multiplied in fortunate destinies.
Existences are oceans of pain, incomparable, terrible, without shores; and with this, feeble strength, a short life, a life spent uselessly seeking food and health amid hunger, sickness, weariness, sleep, sorrows or obstacles, amid fools: it is almost impossible to acquire discernment of what is beneficial and harmful, or to try to put an end to the deeply rooted habit of distraction.
Throughout the course of existence, Mâra ceaselessly strives with all his might to cast us into the hells. [Should we obtain a human existence], the evil paths are many; the mind of unbelief is all but invincible. — And [once this existence is lost], it will be impossible, or all but impossible, to obtain again a human birth in its perfection, to obtain the appearance of a Buddha, to stem the torrent of the passions. — Alas! what a succession of sufferings!
Alas! how pitiful are these wretched beings in such great peril, swept along in the floods of suffering, who do not even see their deplorable plight!
Like madmen who, coming out of the water and feeling cold, would rush into the fire, and repeat this round without end!
In the midst of extreme peril, they imagine themselves safe: they live as though they were immortal and ever young. But behold, terrible calamities come, with death at their head!
I long for the day when I may, through showers of happiness issuing from the cloud of my merits, refresh and soothe the wretched, tormented by the fire of suffering.
And blessed be the day when I may, relying on the truth of appearances, teach emptiness to those who believe in the reality of things, when I may respectfully teach the virtues of merit, free from every notion of reality!
Alas! how pitiful are these wretched beings in such great peril, swept along in the floods of suffering, who do not even see their deplorable plight!
Like madmen who, coming out of the water and feeling cold, would rush into the fire, and repeat this round without end!
In the midst of extreme peril, they imagine themselves safe: they live as though they were immortal and ever young. But behold, terrible calamities come, with death at their head!
I long for the day when I may, through showers of happiness issuing from the cloud of my merits, refresh and soothe the wretched, tormented by the fire of suffering.
And blessed be the day when I may, relying on the truth of appearances, teach emptiness to those who believe in the reality of things, when I may respectfully teach the virtues of merit, free from every notion of reality!
I had intended to publish the translation of the tenth chapter of the Bodhicaryâvatâra: “Dedication of the Merit [Acquired by the Composition of the Present Work to the Happiness and Salvation of Creatures],” remarkable chiefly for its invocations to Vajrapâni, Mañjughoṣa and Mañjuśrî, but otherwise rather poor from the philosophical point of view. All the known manuscripts of the text contain this chapter; so too does the Tibetan version (Tandjour, Mdo XXVI). Moreover, a summary of our treatise (Bodhicaryâvatârapiṇḍârtha) by a certain Dharmapâla (or Rakṣita) cites its first stanza (Mdo XXVII, fol. 213). But, on the one hand, the tradition recorded by Târanâtha, the Tibetan historian of Buddhism, establishes that doubts prevailed within the Community as to the authenticity of this chapter; and, on the other, the most notable of the commentators, Prajñâkaramati, who has served us as our guide, though he knew of the existence of the tenth chapter, neglected to comment upon it. Other interpreters or glossators, Kâla (? Nag-po-pa), Kalyânadeva (Dge-ba-lha), Vairocana, Çîla and Vibhûticandra, did not follow this reserve.