How Temptation and Delight May Be Sins.
The princess of whom we have spoken cannot be blamed for the proposal made to her, since, as we have supposed, it comes to her against her will. But if, on the contrary, she had brought it upon herself by some conduct likely to give rise to the thought—for example, by seeking to please the man who pursues her—she would undoubtedly be guilty of the pursuit itself; and even if she made a show of being coy, she would still deserve blame and punishment. Thus it sometimes happens that temptation alone brings us into sin, because we are the cause of its coming upon us. For example, I know that by playing I expose myself to anger and blasphemy, and that gaming serves as a temptation to me in this respect; hence I sin every time I play, and am guilty of all the temptations that befall me at play. Likewise, I know that a certain company is for me an occasion of temptation and of falling, and yet I go there willingly; it is beyond doubt that I am guilty of all the temptations I shall have there.
When the delight that comes from temptation can be avoided, it is always a sin to receive it; and the sin is greater or less according as the pleasure taken in it and the consent given to it are great or small, long or short. If the princess of whom we have spoken listens not only to the unchaste proposal made to her, but takes pleasure in it and occupies her heart with it gladly, she is greatly to blame; for although she does not wish to carry out what is asked of her, she nevertheless consents to apply her heart to it by the pleasure she takes in it: now, voluntarily to apply one’s heart to an unchaste thing is always blameworthy; and the fault consists so entirely in the application of the heart that, without it, the application of the senses cannot be a sin.
The princess of whom we have spoken cannot be blamed for the proposal made to her, since, as we have supposed, it comes to her against her will. But if, on the contrary, she had brought it upon herself by some conduct likely to give rise to the thought—for example, by seeking to please the man who pursues her—she would undoubtedly be guilty of the pursuit itself; and even if she made a show of being coy, she would still deserve blame and punishment. Thus it sometimes happens that temptation alone brings us into sin, because we are the cause of its coming upon us. For example, I know that by playing I expose myself to anger and blasphemy, and that gaming serves as a temptation to me in this respect; hence I sin every time I play, and am guilty of all the temptations that befall me at play. Likewise, I know that a certain company is for me an occasion of temptation and of falling, and yet I go there willingly; it is beyond doubt that I am guilty of all the temptations I shall have there.
When the delight that comes from temptation can be avoided, it is always a sin to receive it; and the sin is greater or less according as the pleasure taken in it and the consent given to it are great or small, long or short. If the princess of whom we have spoken listens not only to the unchaste proposal made to her, but takes pleasure in it and occupies her heart with it gladly, she is greatly to blame; for although she does not wish to carry out what is asked of her, she nevertheless consents to apply her heart to it by the pleasure she takes in it: now, voluntarily to apply one’s heart to an unchaste thing is always blameworthy; and the fault consists so entirely in the application of the heart that, without it, the application of the senses cannot be a sin.
When, therefore, you are tempted to any sin, consider whether you have voluntarily given occasion to be tempted; for then the temptation itself puts you in a state of sin, because of the danger into which you have cast yourself; and this is understood if you could conveniently have avoided the occasion, and foresaw, or ought to have foreseen, the coming of the temptation. But if you have given no occasion to the temptation, it can in no way be imputed to you as sin.
When the delight which follows the temptation could have been avoided, and nevertheless has not been avoided, there is always some kind of sin, according as one has lingered over it more or less, and according to the cause of the pleasure taken in it. A woman who, having given no occasion for flattering attentions, nevertheless takes pleasure in them, does not cease to be blameworthy, if the pleasure she takes in them has no cause other than the flattering attentions themselves; but if he who seeks to inspire her with love played the lute perfectly, and she took pleasure, not in his wrongful suit, but in the harmony and sweetness of the lute, there would be no sin on her part; nevertheless, she ought not to take this pleasure for long, lest she pass on to taking pleasure in being courted. Likewise, if someone proposes to me a stratagem, full of ingenuity and artifice, by which to avenge myself upon my enemy, and I take no pleasure in, nor give any consent to, the revenge proposed to me, but only in the subtlety of the artifice, it is certain that I do not sin; nevertheless, it is not expedient that I dwell much upon this pleasure, lest little by little it lead me to delight in the revenge itself.
When the delight which follows the temptation could have been avoided, and nevertheless has not been avoided, there is always some kind of sin, according as one has lingered over it more or less, and according to the cause of the pleasure taken in it. A woman who, having given no occasion for flattering attentions, nevertheless takes pleasure in them, does not cease to be blameworthy, if the pleasure she takes in them has no cause other than the flattering attentions themselves; but if he who seeks to inspire her with love played the lute perfectly, and she took pleasure, not in his wrongful suit, but in the harmony and sweetness of the lute, there would be no sin on her part; nevertheless, she ought not to take this pleasure for long, lest she pass on to taking pleasure in being courted. Likewise, if someone proposes to me a stratagem, full of ingenuity and artifice, by which to avenge myself upon my enemy, and I take no pleasure in, nor give any consent to, the revenge proposed to me, but only in the subtlety of the artifice, it is certain that I do not sin; nevertheless, it is not expedient that I dwell much upon this pleasure, lest little by little it lead me to delight in the revenge itself.
It sometimes happens that we take pleasure in the temptation, and this can be, at most, only a slight venial sin; it becomes greater if, after perceiving the evil in which we are, we linger for a while, through negligence, in bargaining with the delight, not knowing whether we ought to accept it or reject it; and the sin is greater still if, perceiving it, we linger for a while through genuine negligence, with no intention whatsoever of rejecting it. But when, voluntarily and with deliberate purpose, we resolve to take pleasure in such delights, this deliberate purpose is in itself a great sin, if the object in which we take pleasure is notably evil. It is a great vice in a woman to wish to entertain illicit loves, even though she has no intention ever of yielding to them.