Of Friendship, and First, of Bad Friendship.
Among all the passions of the soul, love holds the first place; it is the king of all the heart’s movements: it draws everything else to itself, and makes us like that which it loves. Take good heed, therefore, Philothea, that you have no bad love; for you would straightway become wholly bad. Now, friendship is the most dangerous of all loves, because other loves may subsist without any communication of hearts; whereas friendship, being wholly founded upon this communication, it is almost impossible to be the friend of a person without sharing in that person’s qualities.
Not every love is friendship; for one may love someone without being loved in return, and then there is love, but not friendship; since friendship is a mutual love, and if it be not mutual, it is not friendship. Nor is it enough that it be mutual: those who love one another must also know of their mutual affection; otherwise they would have love, but not friendship. Finally, there must be between them some kind of communication which is the foundation of friendship.
According to the diversity of communications, friendship is likewise diverse; and communications differ according to the difference of the goods which are shared. If they be false and vain goods, the friendship is false and vain; if they be true goods, the friendship is true; and the more excellent the goods, the more excellent also is the friendship. For, as the best honey is that which is gathered from the choicest flowers, so likewise the best friendship is that which results from the most perfect communications. And as there is a kind of honey in Heraclea of Pontus which is a true poison, and makes those who eat of it become mad, because it is gathered from aconite, a poisonous plant very abundant in those regions, so friendship founded upon the sharing of false and vicious goods is wholly false and bad.
Among all the passions of the soul, love holds the first place; it is the king of all the heart’s movements: it draws everything else to itself, and makes us like that which it loves. Take good heed, therefore, Philothea, that you have no bad love; for you would straightway become wholly bad. Now, friendship is the most dangerous of all loves, because other loves may subsist without any communication of hearts; whereas friendship, being wholly founded upon this communication, it is almost impossible to be the friend of a person without sharing in that person’s qualities.
Not every love is friendship; for one may love someone without being loved in return, and then there is love, but not friendship; since friendship is a mutual love, and if it be not mutual, it is not friendship. Nor is it enough that it be mutual: those who love one another must also know of their mutual affection; otherwise they would have love, but not friendship. Finally, there must be between them some kind of communication which is the foundation of friendship.
According to the diversity of communications, friendship is likewise diverse; and communications differ according to the difference of the goods which are shared. If they be false and vain goods, the friendship is false and vain; if they be true goods, the friendship is true; and the more excellent the goods, the more excellent also is the friendship. For, as the best honey is that which is gathered from the choicest flowers, so likewise the best friendship is that which results from the most perfect communications. And as there is a kind of honey in Heraclea of Pontus which is a true poison, and makes those who eat of it become mad, because it is gathered from aconite, a poisonous plant very abundant in those regions, so friendship founded upon the sharing of false and vicious goods is wholly false and bad.
Friendship founded upon the communication of outward and sensible goods is altogether gross and unworthy of the name of friendship; as is also that founded upon certain vain and frivolous virtues, which have likewise no other end than the gratification of the senses. By outward and sensible goods I mean those which immediately and chiefly appeal to the outward senses, such as the pleasure of seeing beauty, hearing a sweet voice, or engaging in agreeable conversation. By frivolous virtues I mean certain vain accomplishments and qualities which weak minds call virtues and perfections.
Listen to what most girls, women, and young men say; they will not hesitate to tell you: “Such-and-such a gentleman has great merit; he is a perfect man, for he dances delightfully, excels at every kind of game, is always dressed in the best taste, sings admirably well, has the finest tone and the most agreeable manners.” Ah, Philothea, what a judgment! Is this not how charlatans judge one another, esteeming the one who excels in buffoonery to be the most perfect? Now, since all this concerns the senses, the friendships that arise from it are called sensual, vain, and frivolous, and deserve rather the name of dalliance than of friendship. Such are ordinarily the friendships of young people, who suffer themselves to be enchanted by moustaches, hair, a glance, a garment, a bearing, and chatter. Friendships worthy of an age in which virtue is still but a shoot and judgment still but a bud; and so such friendships are but fleeting, melting like snow in the sun.
Listen to what most girls, women, and young men say; they will not hesitate to tell you: “Such-and-such a gentleman has great merit; he is a perfect man, for he dances delightfully, excels at every kind of game, is always dressed in the best taste, sings admirably well, has the finest tone and the most agreeable manners.” Ah, Philothea, what a judgment! Is this not how charlatans judge one another, esteeming the one who excels in buffoonery to be the most perfect? Now, since all this concerns the senses, the friendships that arise from it are called sensual, vain, and frivolous, and deserve rather the name of dalliance than of friendship. Such are ordinarily the friendships of young people, who suffer themselves to be enchanted by moustaches, hair, a glance, a garment, a bearing, and chatter. Friendships worthy of an age in which virtue is still but a shoot and judgment still but a bud; and so such friendships are but fleeting, melting like snow in the sun.